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The American Bar Association's Code of Professional Responsibility
stringently limits an attorney's out-of-court verbal and written criticism
of judges and courts. It purports to -do so in an effort to preserve the
public's respect and confidence in our judicial system. However, it ap-
pears from the Code and applicable case law that the attorney's right
to freedom of speech under the First Amendment has been either ig-
nored or considered inferior to his professional responsibilities to the
legal system.
This article will examine the constitutionality, under the First
Amendment, of these codified limitations, and will contrast them to the
limitations imposed by law upon a layperson's freedom of expression.
Amendments* to the Code of Professional Responsibility will also be
presented in an effort to harmonize these often conflicting rights and
limitations.
Under these amendments, an attorney's right to free speech need
not be inferior to his duties and responsibilities to his profession. Only
by allowing a lawyer to speak his mind freely can the American judicial
system ever be expected to improve. As active participants in the courts,
lawyers have the education and experience to assume a position as
critics and commentators on the performance and attitudes of judges.
i. THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
AND ITS RESTRAINTS
The Code of Professional Responsibility serves both as an inspira-
tional guide to members of the legal profession and as a source for
disciplinary action. It is composed of three interrelated parts: Canons,
Ethical Considerations, and Disciplinary Rules.'
1. The reason for including the Ethical Considerations and Disciplinary Rules in
the Code was to "forestall or answer an attack against the Disciplinary Rules on the
ground that they are arbitrary, and therefore unconstitutional. . . ." Wright. The Code
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The Canons are "statements of axiomatic norms. . . . They em-
body the general concepts from which the Ethical Considerations and
the Disciplinary Rules are derived."' 2 The Ethical Considerations "...
represent the objectives toward which every member of the [legall pro-
fession should strive,' ' 3 and thus provide a body of principles to guide
lawyers in regulating their professional conduct. The Disciplinary Rules
are mandatory and ". . . state the minimum level of conduct below
which no lawyer can fall without being subject to disciplinary action."'
The Code further notes that "an enforcing agency, in applying the
Disciplinary Rules, may find interpretive guidance in the basic princi-
ples embodied in the Canons and in the objectives reflected in the Ethi-
cal Considerations."'
This interrelation among the sections allows the Canons and Ethi-
cal Considerations to be filtered through the Disciplinary Rules and thus
serve as a basis for disciplinary action.$ Therefore, to determine the
Code's effect on a lawyer's freedom of expression, it should be consid-
ered in its totality.
For example, it is misconduct for a lawyer to "engage in conduct
that is prejudicial to the administration of justice."' Because the lan-
guage of this Disciplinary Rule does not define the specific conduct
sought to be regulated, the following Ethical Considerations operate to
define and limit its scope.
A lawyer "should be temperate and dignified" in his dealings.8
When purporting to act on behalf of the public in seeking change, "he
should espouse only those changes which he conscientiously believes to
be in the public interest."' When commenting on judges or other adjudi-
catory officials, he should always be "certain of the merit of his com-
plaint, use appropriate language, and avoid petty criticisms, for unres-
trained and intemperate statements tend to lessen public confidence in
of Professional Responsibility: Its History and Objectives, 24 ARK. L. REv. !, 11 (1970).
2. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Preliminary Statement
[hereinafter cited as ABA CoDEI].
3. Id.
4. id.
5. Id.
6. See Justices of the App. Div., First Dept. v. Erdman, 33 N.Y.2d 559, 301
N.E.2d 426, 347 N.Y.S. 441 (1973), where a dissenting judge indicated that Ethical
Considerations alone could be the basis for disciplinary action.
7. ABA CODE, DR 1-102 (A)(5).
8. ABA CODE, EC 1-5.
9. ABA CODE, EC 8-4.
2
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our legal system."' 10 This last Ethical Consideration, in particular,
echoes the traditional fear of the Bar that criticism of the legal system
will lessen confidence in the courts, causing laypersons to resort to self-
help rather than to the judicial process.
Because of this fear, a statement by an attorney that would make
the legal system appear corrupt or incompetent, or a statement that
could be construed to reduce public confidence in the legal system, could
be subject to disciplinary action as conduct "prejudicial to the adminis-
tration of justice." Thus, the term "conduct," as used in Disciplinary
Rule 1-102 (A) (5),11 and as defined by the Ethical Considerations,
encompasses a broad area of speech including statements made in a
lawyer's official capacity, in his private capacity, or on behalf of the
public.
The Code explicitly recognizes that a lawyer, by virtue of his under-
standing of the law and his direct involvement with the courts, has both
a right and duty to speak out for needed change in the legal system. 12
However, this apparent recognition of an attorney's right to freedom of
expression is curbed by the restrictions of the Ethical Considerations
and the Disciplinary Rules. The confusing case law, combined with the
vagueness of the Code itself, presents a lawyer with an ironic situation.
By trying to comply with the spirit of the Code and his own sense of
professional responsibility, the outspoken lawyer could find himself dis-
ciplined by the Bar and possibly expelled from the same system he was
trying to improve.
2. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF RESTRAINTS
In Bradley v. Fisher,3 the United States Supreme Court first
emphasized the obligation of attorneys to adhere to high standards of
honor and propriety. This case involved an appeal from an order disbar-
ring an attorney who defended John H. Suratt in his trial for the murder
of Abraham Lincoln.
The presiding judge summarily disbarred the attorney because he
allegedly had accosted the judge in a "rude and insulting manner," and
10. ABA CODE, EC 8-6.
I1. "A lawyer shall not: Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administra-
tion of justice."
12. ABA CODE, EC 8-1. "By reason of education and experience, lawyers are
especially qualified to recognize deficiencies in the legal system and to initiate corrective
measures therein."
13. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871).
| 1:97
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had charged the judge with making insulting comments from the bench.
The judge further alleged that he had been threatened with personal
chastisement.'4
The Supreme Court, in its opinion, upheld the disbarment and
proceeded to state the words which, to this day, echo in disbarment
proceedings:
The obligation which attorneys impliedly assume, if they do not by ex-
press declaration take upon themselves, when they are admitted to the
Bar, is not merely to be obedient to the Constitution and laws, but to
maintain at all times the respect due to courts of justice and judicial
officers. This obligation is not discharged by merely observing the rules
of courteous demeanor in open court, but it includes abstaining out of
court from all insulting language and offensive conduct toward the judges
personally for their judicial acts."
The Court further indicated that a threat to a judge of personal
chastisement, when made by an attorney out of court, would constitute
valid grounds for disbarment."6
The Court did not, however, weigh the professional obligations of
an attorney against his First Amendment right of free speech. By failing
to do so, it established the practice of treating a lawyer's right of free
speech more strictly than that of a layman. For example, in Bradley,
the facts indicate that the communication from the lawyer to the judge
was not heard by anyone in the courtroom. 7 Therefore, if the attorney
had been a layperson, an action for slander would have been ground-
less.'8
The standards of Bradley were incorporated into the Canons of
Professional Ethics, which were adopted by the American Bar Associa-
tion in 1908."1 These Canons tend to ignore a lawyer's freedom of speech
by expressly prohibiting public criticism of judges or other lawyers in
14. Id. at 337.
15. Id. at 355.
16. Id. at 356.
17. Id. at 338.
18. Since the interest protected is that of reputation, it is essential to tort liability
for either libel or slander that the defamation be communicated to someone other than
the person defamed. Where there is no communication to anyone but the plaintiff, there
may be criminal responsibility, or a possible action for the intentional infliction of
mental suffering, but no tort action can be maintained upon the theory of defamation.
W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS, 766 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as LAW OF ToRTs].
19. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHics No. 24.
4
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other than the "proper tribunals."' The judicial system is thus encased
in a sphere of immunity from criticism by lawyers, for the purpose of
maintaining the necessary public confidence in our courts. This imposed
silence has, for the most part, been enforced by the courts, to the detri-
ment of First Amendment rights.
Typical of the cases resulting in attorney disbarment for criticism
of judges or the judicial system are Cobb v. United States21 and
Wilhelm's Case.2 In Cobb, a letter from an attorney, published in a
newspaper, accused a "judge of being under the sinister influence of a
gang which [had] paralyzed [the judge] for two years."' The court
stated that "a published communication reflecting upon the character
or integrity of a judge. . . is conduct unbecoming an attorney for which
he may be summarily disbarred. ' ' 4 There was some indication in the
opinion, however, that if the charges were proven true, no disciplinary
action would lie. This heavy burden of proof, however, was placed on
the attorney.
In Wilhelm, while a proceeding to disbar a fellow attorney was
pending, Wilhelm made an impassioned speech on behalf of his col-
league, saying that "they were trying to crucify him [and] referred to
the disbarment proceedings against [his colleague] as a conspiracy."' 3
The court, in upholding disbarment, held that the speech was intended
to incite popular feelings against the judge and interfere with a fair and
impartial consideration of the case. The court made no mention of the
attorney's right to freedom of speech, nor did it apply the clear and
present danger test,21 which is used to determine whether spoken words
20. Id. No. 29.
21. 172 F. 641 (9th Cir. 1909).
22. 269 Pa. 416, 112 A. 560 (1921).
23. 172 F. 641, 645.
24. Id. at 644.
25. 112 A. 560, 561.
26. See, e.g., Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941). In Bridges, the Court
quoted language from earlier cases to the effect "that there must be a determination of
whether or not the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature
as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils."
Id. at 261. "What finally emerges from the 'clear and present danger' cases is a working
principle that the substantive evil must be extremely serious and the degree of immin-
ence extremely high before utterances can be punished." Id. at 263. For other decisions
upholding attorney disbarment without application of the "'clear and present danger'
test," see In re Doss, 367 Ill. 570, 12 N.E.2d 659 (1937) (disbarment for critical com-
ments in newspaper stories which appeared after the trial in which the attorney and
judge were involved); In re Knight, 264 App. Div. 106, 34 N.Y.S.2d 810 (1942) (disbar-
5
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Some courts, in applying the Bradley standard,21 have held the First
Amendment inapplicable. Because of a lawyer's oath of admission to
the Bar and the Code of Professional Responsibility, the courts seem
to have created a double standard which distinguishes a lawyer's right
to free speech from that of a layman.2 In effect, these courts have held
that a person gives up his right to criticize the judicial system when he
becomes a lawyer. A lawyer is considered an officer of the court at all
times, and must bear his yoke of discipline in exchange for his member-
ship in the Bar.?
A case highlighting the different standards imposed on attorneys
and laypersons is In re Woodward,3 where the court, in upholding a
three-year suspension of an attorney, said:
A layman may, perhaps, pursue his theories of free speech. . . until he
runs afoul of the penalties of libel and slander, or into some infraction of
our statutory law. A member of the Bar can, and will, be stopped at the
point where he infringes our Canon of Ethics.'
A fairly recent case illustrating the same point is In re Raggio,32
where the district attorney of Washoe County, Nevada, criticized a
ruling of the state supreme court during a television interview.
The court held that free speech does not give a lawyer the right to
publicly denigrate the court,3 and that the statements by the district
attorney caused the court to become a center of controversy, which
resulted in the erosion of "public confidence in our system of adminis-
ment for critical comments contained in written statements circulated by an attorney
to state and Bar officials).
27. See text accompanying note 15, supra.
28. See, e.g., In re Troy, 43 R.I. 279, 111 A. 723 (1920); State Bar Com. ex rel.
Williams v. Sullivan, 35 Okla. 745, 131 P. 703 (1912); In re Thatcher, 80 Ohio St. 492,
89 N.E. 39 (1909).
29. See Karlin v. Culkin, 248 N.Y. 465, 470-71, 162 N.E. 487, 489 (1928) for a
discussion by Judge Cardozo of the duties of an attorney as an "officer of the court."
30. 300 S.W.2d 385 (Mo. 1957).
31. Id. at 393-94.
32. 87 Nev. 369, 487 P.2d 499 (1971). The district attorney had characterized the
court's opinion as "most shocking, certainly to this office. . . . I feel that it's an
example of judicial legislation at its worst. In my opinion, this is the most shocking and
outrageous decision in the history of the supreme court of this state. It's unexplainable,
and in my opinion totally uncalled for." Id. at 500.
33. Id.
Nova Law Journal 1:1977 1
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tering justice."u Without considering the motive behind his statements,
the court reprimanded him, saying:
We are never surprised when persons, not intimately involved with the
administration of justice, speak out in anger or frustration about our
work and the manner in which we perform it, and shall protect their right
to so express themselves. A member of the Bar, however, stands in differ-
ent position by reason of his oath of office and the standards of conduct
which he is so sworn to uphold. Conformity with those standards has
proven essential to the administration of justice in our courts. u
It is clear that these cases which have applied the Bradley standard
have firmly established a rule that an attorney's right to free speech is
curtailed in deference to the Bar's deeply entrenched fear that a critical
comment by a lawyer will reduce respect for the legal system."
However, In re Sawyer-" marked a turning point in the application
of the rigid Bradley standard. In Sawyer, an attorney, while defending
certain persons accused of violating the Smith Act,3' made a public
speech in which she referred to the "horrible and shocking things at
trial; the necessity, if the Government's case were to be proved, of
scrapping the rules of evidence; and the creation of new crimes unless
the trial were stopped at once."'"
The U.S. Supreme Court, in opposing her disbarment, said:
We conclude that there is no support for any further factual inference that
the petitioner was voicing strong criticism of Smith Act cases and the
Government's manner of proving them, and that her references to the
happenings at the Honolulu trial were illustrative of this, and not a reflec-
tion in any way upon Judge Wiig personally or his conduct of the trial."
34. Id.
35. Id. at 500-501. The court did not say in what way these standards has proven
essential.
36. A few cases standing alone in this area of precedent refused to let the Bradley
standard infringe on a lawyer's constitutional rights. See, e.g., In re Hickey, 149 Tenn.
344, 258 S.W. 417 (1924); State ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. Circuit Ct., 97 Wis. 1, 72 N.W.
193 (1897).
37. 360 U.S. 622 (1959).
38. 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1950). The Smith Act makes it unlawful for any person to
advocate the overthrow of any government of the United States by force or violence or
the organization of any group for that purpose.
39. 360 U.S. 622, 630.
40. Id. at 628.
1 1:97
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Justice Brennan, speaking for the majority, further stated: "We can
conceive no ground whereby the pendency of litigation might be thought
to make an attorney's out-of-court remarks more censurable, other than
that they might tend to obstruct the administration of justice,'", and
added that ". . . lawyers are free to criticize the state of law." 2
This case illustrated three different judicial opinions about review
of an attorney's freedom of speech. Both Justice Brennan's and Justice
Frankfurter's tests were conspicuously liberal in comparison to Stew-
art's adherence to the traditional Bradley standard. 3 Both would allow
criticism of the legal system. Justice Brennan would look to the effect
of the speech and restrict it only if it tended to interfere with the admin-
istration of justice. Justice Frankfurter would examine the motives be-
hind the speech and restrict only those speakers who attempt to preju-
dice a pending case. It is significant that eight Supreme Court Justices
indicated that a lawyer can criticize the legal system, and thus refused
to accept the traditional Bradley standard. Although Sawyer did not
authoritatively determine the extent of an attorney's protection from
imposition of discipline by the Bar,44 several courts have expanded con-
stitutional protection for an attorney's speech.
For example, Justice Brennan's test was applied in Polk v. State
Bar of Texas,15 where a lawyer, who was also a defendant in a criminal
action, sought to enjoin the State Bar of Texas from issuing a public
reprimand. The state court had found that a press release by the defen-
dant, criticizing the judge and prosecutor, was in violation of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. The press release stated: "I consider this
41. Id. at 636.
42. Id. at 631.
43. Stewart, J., in his concurring opinion, asserted the traditional standard for-
mulated in Bradley that an attorney must conform to ". . . inherited standards of
propriety and honor" as a condition to his right to practice law. He joined the majority
only because he felt there were not enough facts to warrant discipline under Bradley.
Id. at 646, 647.
Frankfurter, J., in his dissent, recognized the right of lawyers to criticize the courts.
"Indeed, they are under a special responsibility to exercise fearlessness in doing so," he
said. His opinion stated, however, that a court must balance an attorney's freedom of
speech against the need for high standards in the legal profession and that conduct of
the kind found in Sawyer could not be deemed to be protected by the Constitution. Id.
at 668-69.
44. See State Bar v. Semann, 508 S.W.2d 429, 433 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
45. 374 F. Supp. 784 (1974).
46. Polk was able to attack the decision on First Amendment grounds in federal
court, since that issue had never been raised in the state court. Id. at 787.
8
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one more awkward attempt by a dishonest and unethical district attor-
ney and a perverse judge to assure me an unfair trial. 47 Polk alleged
that a public reprimand would violate his right to free speech under the
First and Fourteenth Amendments, and that since he acted in his capac-
ity as a private citizen and not as an attorney, the state had no legitimate
interest in regulating his speech. The Federal District Court reversed
and stated:
It cannot be seriously asserted that a private citizen surrenders his right
to freedom of expression when he becomes a licensed attorney in this state
... .[OInly in those instances where misconduct threatens a significant
state interest can a state restrict an attorney's exercise of his rights under
the Constitution.
Because there was no showing by the State Bar that Polk's statements
interfered with the orderly administration of justice, the court held that
"the state [had] no more interest to punish Polk for his conduct as a
private citizen than it [did] to punish a mechanic, businessman or other
nonlawyers for the same conduct."" If a reprimand were to be issued
here, the court said, it would have a chilling effect on any future speech
47. Id. at 786.
48. Id. at 787. The court defined two instances when the State would have the
requisite significant interest. The first was where an attorney's conduct "shows his
inability to represent clients competently and honestly," and second, where his conduct
"interferes with the process of the administration of justice, such as bribery of jurors,
subornation of perjury, misrepresentations to a court or any other conduct which under-
mines the legitimacy of the judicial process." Unless the lawyer's conduct clearly falls
into one of these two categories, "a state may not regulate an attorney's exercise of his
right to free speech under the guise of prohibiting professional misconduct." Id. at 788.
49. Id. The court also rejected
the contention. . . that in order to maintain the general esteem of the public in
the legal profession both professional and non-professional conduct of an attorney
in all matters must be above and beyond that conduct of non lawyers. While this
elitist conception may be applicable in non-First Amendment circumstances, the
interest of the State in maintaining the public esteem of the legal profession does
not rationally justify disciplinary action for speech which is protected and is
outside the scope of an attorney's professional and official conduct. Where the
protection of the Constitution conflicts with the efficiency of a system to ensure
professional conduct, it is the Constitution that must prevail and the system that
must be modified to conform.
Id. See also Jackson v. State, 21 Tex. 668 (1858), where an attorney's abusive criticism
of a judge was held not to be misconduct, since it was made outside the scope of his
official conduct as an attorney.
9
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protected under the First Amendment ° Polk is significant in its com-
plete rejection not only of the Bradley standard, but also of the tradi-
tional fear that critical comment would harm the legal system.
A case equating a lawyer's right to free speech to that of a layman's
is State Bar v. Semann,5 which indicated that an attorney's out-of-court
statements about public officials, including judges, were subject to the
libel siandard of New York Times v. Sullivan.12
Semann involved a consolidation of two appeals which grew out of
the same set of facts. In response to a newspaper editorial criticizing a
district judge, Semann wrote a letter to the editor in which he expressed
his agreement with the editorial and compared the judge unfavorably
with three other criminal court judges, saying: "Standing beside these
men [the judge] is a midget among giants."53 Another attorney wrote
a letter in reply, highly praising the judge and saying that Semann's
criticism of him was based on the fact that, when the judge was an
assistant district attorney, he "had fought Mr. Semann. . .toe-to-toe
and blow-by-blow . . . in the courtroom. 'M Semann replied to this
letter with still another published letter in which he first belittled hig
adversary as an attorney, and then denied the statement regarding his
motive for criticizing the judge. The Grievance Committee found that
the three letters violated Disciplinary Rule 1-102 (A)(5)51 and Discipli-
nary Rule 2-101(A)m of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
ordered formal reprimandsY
The court set aside both formal reprimands, and said:
It is recognized that persons who make derogatory statements about
public officials, including judges, are protected by the First and Four-
teenth Amendments of the United States Constitution from imposition
of civil and criminal liability, unless the statement is made with knowl-
50. 374 F. Supp. 784, 788-89. See also Justices of App. Div., First Dept. v.
Erdmann, 33 N.Y.2d 559, 301 N.E.2d 426, 347 N.Y.S. 441 (1973), where the court
avoided making a constitutional ruling, but nevertheless reversed an order to censure
for an attorney's critical comments which appeared in Life magazine.
51. 508 S.W.2d 429 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
52. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
53. 508 S.W.2d 429, 431.
54. Id.
55. See note II, supra.
56. "A lawyer shall not prepare, cause to be prepared, use or participate in the
use of any form of public communication that contains professionally self-laudatory
statements calculated to attract lay clients."
57. 508 S.W.2d 429, 431.
10
Nova Law Review, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [1977], Art. 7
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol1/iss1/7
Free Speech: Lawyer's v. Layman's Rights
1 1:1977
edge that it is false or with reckless disregard of whether it is false or not.
Such protection . . extends on the same terms to lawyers, at least for
utterances made outside the course of judicial proceedings."
The court could find nothing in the Code specifically relating to
criticism of fellow attorneys but recognized that such action, when con-
ducted in a public forum, could, in extreme situations, be prejudicial to
the administration of justice. "However it cannot be said that isolated
incidents of the nature contained in [the last two letters] raise a fact issue
of professional misconduct as prohibited by Disciplinary Rule 1-102."1
These cases indicate the confusing situation confronting an attor-
ney. Urged by the Code to participate in improving the legal system,"
he faces the possibility of imposition of discipline because of that same
Code's concentration on the maintenance of respect for the legal sys-
tem."1 Although the First Amendment recognizes an attorney's right to
free speech, conduct that could reduce respect for the legal system can
still be punished, as it was under Bradley, as "conduct that is prejudicial
to the administration of justice."' 2 This confusion is compounded by
courts' tendencies to hold lawyers' expressions to a higher standard of
propriety than that of a layperson.
3. RESTRAINTS ON LAYPERSONS
A. Contempt Powers
Paralleling the cases in which disciplinary action was taken against
lawyers for conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice are cases
in which contempt powers of the court were used to punish laypersons
for interference with the administration of justice. The standard of con-
stitutional protection of the layperson's speech, however, compared with
that of a lawyer's, is much greater.
An important case which dealt with a layperson's freedom of
speech was Bridges v. California." In that case, a union official caused
the publication of a telegram that was sent to the Secretary of Labor.
58. Id. at 432-33.
59. Id. at 433.
60. ABA CODE, EC 8-1, 8-2.
61. ABA CODE, Preamble, EC 1-5, 8-6.
62. ABA CODE, DR 1-102(A)(5).
63. 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
11
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The telegram stated the union's intention not to allow the state courts
to override the majority vote of the union in choosing its officers and
representatives. The Court, in reversing the contempt conviction, held
that contempt sanctions for out-of-court publications were to be gov-
erned by the "clear and present danger" standard. Under this standard,
sanctions can be imposed if the substantive evil of the speech is ex-
tremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high. 4
There is also language in one Supreme Court case, Craig v.
Harney,5 expressing the position that judges may not invoke their con-
tempt powers merely to shelter themselves from criticism. In that case,
a newspaper editor had been held in contempt for news reports and
editorials which criticized the judge's handling of a private law suit. The
editorial called the judge's behavior "high handed" and a "travesty on
justice." Justice Douglas' majority opinion stated: "The law of con-
tempt is not made for the protection of judges who may be sensitive to
the winds of public opinion. Judges are supposed to be men of fortitude
able to thrive in a hearty climate."6
In Wood v. Georgia,67 the Court applied the "clear and present
danger" test in determining whether a judge could hold the local sheriff
in contempt for having "issued to the local press a written statement"
critical of the judge's political motives and his handling of the local
grand jury.6"
In reversing the contempt conviction, Mr. Chief Justice Warren
said:
Men are entitled to speak as they please on matters vital to them; errors
in judgment or substantiated opinions may be exposed, of course, but not
through punishment for contempt for the expression. . . Hence, in the
absence of some other showing of a substantive evil actually designed to
impede the course of justice in justification of the exercise of the contempt
64. Id. at 263. See also Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946), where the
Supreme Court applied the clear and present danger standard and reversed a contempt
citation against a newspaper editor for his critical editorials and cartoons aimed at local
judges.
65. 331 U.S. 367 (1947).
66. Id. at 376.
67. 370. U.S. 375 (1962).
68. The judge had given special instructions to the grand jury to investigate
charges of election law violations in the county. He was also accused of racial prejudice,
since the investigation was to concentrate on the phenomenon of negro block voting.
12
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power to silence the, petitioner, his utterances are entitled to be
[constitutionally] protected."
The above cases indicate that the clear and present danger standard
protects a layperson's out-of-court conduct against the imposition of
contempt penalties unless it is shown to pose an imminent threat to the
administration of justice. Thus, without more, comments concerning a
judge's fitness or actions taken in his official capacity would seem to
be protected under the First Amendment. If this type of conduct by a
layman does not pose a danger to the administration of justice, then, a
fortiori, the same conduct by a lawyer should be protected by the First
Amendment.
B. Libel and Slander
In addition to the contempt powers of the court, a layperson's right
to speak freely is also subject to a possible suit for libel or slander.
However, a public official such as a judge would probably have a diffi-
cult time sustaining such an action against a layperson because of the
lenient test imposed by the Supreme Court in New York Times v.
Sullivan.0 In Sullivan, the Court created a constitutional privilege for
statements concerning the official conduct of a public official. For dam-
ages to be awarded, the defamation must have been made with "actual
malice." That is, the plaintiff must show either that the defendant knew
the statement was false at the time it was made, or that the statement
was made with reckless disregard of the truth." The term public official
refers to "those among the hierarchy of government employees who
have, or appear to the public to have, substantial responsibility for or
control over the conduct of governmental affairs.""
In Gertz v. Welch,7 3 the New York Times rule was extended to
69. 370 U.S. 375,389 (emphasis added). Looking at the record in light of the clear
and present danger test, the Court said: "[In the absence of any showing of an actual
interference with the undertakings of the grand jury, this record lacks persuasion in
illustrating the serious degree of harm to the administration of law necessary to justify
exercise of the contempt power." Id. at 393 (emphasis added). The Court also rejected
the argument that because the petitioner was a sheriff, he owed a special duty and
responsibility to the court and its judges, and that therefore his right to freedom of
expression must be more severely curtailed than that of a private person. Id. at 394.
70. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
71. See LAW OF TORTS, 821.
72. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966).
73. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
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include statements concerning public figures. A person is deemed a
"public figure" if he achieves general fame or notoriety for a limited
range of issues into which he has voluntarily or involuntarily become
involved.74 A judge appointed to the bench would thus be a public figure,
and an elected judge would be a public official. In both cases, critical
comment by a layperson of a judge's official conduct would seem to be
constitutionally protected so long as it was not made with actual malice.
Recognizing that this liberal standard is not applied in Bar discipli-
nary proceedings against attorneys, it is necessary to determine if the
stricter standard applicable to attorneys is justified. The Bar appears to
base its regulatory interest upon the fear that critical comment will
reduce public confidence in the legal system and respect for the law,
thereby interfering with the administration of justice. To determine if
there is a need for this higher standard, it is necessary to explore
whether, in actuality, this fear is justified.
4. MAINTAINING RESPECT FOR THE
LEGAL SYSTEM
Mr. Justice Black, in Bridges v. California,75 stated:
The assumption that respect for the judiciary can be 'won by shielding
judges from published criticism wrongfully appraises the character of the
American public opinion. For it is a prized American privilege to speak
one's mind, although not always with perfect good taste, on all public
institutions. And an enforced silence, however limited, solely in the name
of preserving the dignity of the bench, would probably engender resent-
ment, suspicion, and contempt much more than it would enhance re-
spect.7
The framers of the Constitution envisioned the First Amendment
as a means of promoting robust debate in a free market place of ideas.
That Amendment has also been held to protect statements made outside
the courtroom unless the statements constituted a clear and present
danger to the administration of justice.1
74. See LAW OF TORTS, 823.
75. 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
76. Id. at 270-71.
77. Thomhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
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Another consideration weighed heavily by the framers and the Su-
preme Court is the need of the public for information about certain
areas of public concern. The Court, in Sullivan, held that speech critical
of a public official's conduct would be protected under the First Amend-
ment unless the statement was shown to have been made with "actual
malice." Neither factual error nor injury to official reputation suffices
to remove the constitutional shield from criticism of official conduct. 8
The Court in Sullivan also talked about the chilling effect of requir-
ing someone to prove the truth of his statement, or face liability for it."
This situation closely parallels the requirements of Ethical Considera-
tion 8-6 that a lawyer be certain of the merit of his complaint. The
difficulty of proving the "certainty" of his complaint exerts a "chilling
effect" upon an attorney's enjoymentof his constitutional rights.8 In
addition, this requirement disregards the need for constructive criticism
of judges, especially where that judge is an elected official, and the need
to point out deficiencies and suggest needed improvements in the sys-
tem. This chilling effect is especially pronounced when the attorney's
statement is general, and the truth of that statement is, by its very
nature, hard to prove.
For an attorney to suffer additional restraints on his First Amend-
ment rights, the courts should require a showing of a clear and present
danger that his speech will hinder and obstruct the administration of
justice. As an attorney, his statements are presumed to interfere with
the administration of justice. The Code seems to base its regulation of
an attorney's out-of-court speech on an irrebuttable presumption that
the speech will interfere with the administration of justice. This fact is
not necessarily and universally true. It is the content of the speech, and
not the occupation of the speaker, that should determine the danger to
the legal system. If this distinction is noted, it becomes evident that this
presumption has no basis in fact. An attorney, by virtue of his under-
standing of the law and his direct involvement with the courts, is best
able to articulate those areas of the system needing improvements. A
statement made by an attorney should carry no more weight than the
same statement uttered by a mayor, governor, or senator, and should
78. 376 U.S. 254, 279-83.
79. Id. at 279.
80. See, e.g., Okla. Bar Assoc. v. Grimes, 436 P.2d 40 (1967), where the disbar-
ment of an attorney for accusing justices of a state court of accepting bribes was ordered
withdrawn when, after the disbarment, some members of the court were found to have
been guilty of corruption.
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not be any more restricted. Statements by an attorney, critical of the
legal system, do not present a clear and present danger to the adminis-
tration of justice. The injury to the legal system that the traditional fear
embodies has no basis in fact.
5. PROPOSED REVISIONS TO THE CODE
Recognizing this unequal treatment of lawyers, the American Bar
Association should take steps to assure that a lawyer's criticism of his
profession can be more compatible with his First Amendment rights.
The Bar should recognize that this lack of constitutional protection
exerts a chilling effect on a lawyer's free speech, since an expensive and
lengthy appeal must be taken before any infringed rights can be vindi-
cated. Therefore, the Code should be amended in light of the First
Amendment. This would remove the chilling effect that exists under the
present Code.
Disciplinary Rule 1-102 (A) (5) (amended)
A LAWYER SHALL NOT ENGAGE IN CONDUCT THAT IS
LIKELY TO PRESENT A CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER TO
THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN A PENDING CASE.81
This Disciplinary Rule, by virtue of the.amendment to Ethical
Consideration 8-6 (below), would not apply to speech by an attorney,
spoken as a private citizen, unless that speech can be shown to present
a clear and present danger to the administration of justice.
The addition of the words "in a pending case" would restrict an
attorney's statements made in his legal capacity to those instances where
a case has not been concluded and there is a danger that comments
could di&t6fly prejudice the trial. The word "pending" here refers to a
case that has not reached a final judgment and would include cases
pending on appeal.
Ethical Consideration 8-6 (amended)
Adjudicatory officials, not being wholly free to defend themselves,
are entitled to receive support of the Bar against unjust criticism. Where
a lawyer is speaking in his official capacity, or on behalf of a client, he
should be certain of the merit of his complaint, use appropriate lan-
81. Disciplinary Rule 1-102 (A)(5) now reads: "A lawyer shall not engage in
conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice."
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guage, and avoid petty criticisms, for unrestrained and intemperate
statements, in this capacity motivated by reasons other than a desire to
improve the legal system, are not justified. A lawyer, as a private citizen,
has the right to criticize such officials publicly. His statements in this
capacity are constitutionally protected unless it is shown that the state-
ments present a clear and present danger to the administration of jus-
tice. Because the lawyer's capacity will be determined from the circum-
stances of his conduct, he should make clear in what capacity he
speaks.2
This amendment reflects the necessity of a lawyer, when speaking
in his official capacity, to consider carefully the merits of his complaint
because, in this capacity, his statements could have a disproportionate
effect on the administration of justice.
Where a lawyer is speaking as a private citizen, the state has a
greatly diminished interest in regulating his speech. A lawyer is speaking
as a private citizen when he is not speaking on behalf of a client or as
attorney of record, and he is stating his own opinion or an opinion he
personally shares with a segment of the public.
The above amendments should have the effect of splitting the Disci-
plinary Rules applicable to a lawyer's speech. Disciplinary Rule 1-102
(A) (5) (amended) would apply to speech by an attorney in his official
capacity. Disciplinary Rule 8-102 states:
(A) A lawyer shall not knowingly make false statements of fact
concerning the qualifications of a candidate for election or appointment
to a judicial office.
(B) A lawyer shall not knowingly make false accusations against
a judge or other adjudicatory officer.
This rule would apply to an attorney's speech as a private citizen
and would hold him to the same standard as a layperson. In a grievance
committee hearing it would thus be necessary for the Bar first to deter-
mine in what capacity the attorney's comments were made. If the com-
mittee found that the statement was made in the capacity of a private
citizen, the Bar could discipline the Attorney under Disciplinary Rule
82. Ethical Consideration 8-6 now reads:
Adjudicatory officials, not being wholly free to defend themselves are entitled to
receive the support of the Bar against unjust criticism. While a lawyer as a citizen
has a right to criticize such officials publicly, he should be certain of the merit of
his complaint, use appropriate language, and avoid petty criticisms, for
unrestrained and intemperate statements tend to lessen public confidence in our
legal system. Criticisms motivated by reasons other than a desire to improve the
legal system are not justified.
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8-102 only if it were shown that the attorney made the statement with
knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard for its truth. The
burden of proving this would be placed on the Bar rather than on the
attorney. If the Bar determined that the conduct of the attorney was
directed toward producing imminent lawness action, and was likely to
incite or produce such action, disciplinary action would be proper under
Rule 1-102 (A) (5) (amended).
6. APPLICATION
Wilhelm's Case,3 where the attorney made an impassioned speech
on behalf of his colleague who was the subject of a disbarment proceed-
ing, provides an interesting example of how the Bar would have to
proceed under these amended rules. Under these new standards, the Bar
would first have to determine in what capacity the speech was made.
Here, because the speech was made to a public gathering and not in a
courtroom or other judicial assembly, and because Wilhelm was
speaking on his own behalf, the statement would be classified as coming
from a private citizen. For action to lie under Disciplinary Rule 8-102,
the burden of proof would then be on the Bar to show that he knew the
statements were false when he made them. However, since the case was
pending at the time the speech was made, if the Bar could show that
the speech was likely to incite or product imminent lawless action,
discipline would lie under Disciplinary Rule 1-102 (A) (5) (amended.).
In Polk v. State Bar of Texas," Polk's statement in his press release
was made about a pending case in which he was the defendant. It
therefore could only have been made in his capacity as a private citizen.
To apply the standard of Disciplinary Rule 8-102, the Bar would have
to show that Polk knew his statement to be false at the time he made
it. Since Polk was commenting on the way his own case was progressing,
it is doubtful that knowledge of its falsity could be shown. Nor would
discipline succeed under Disciplinary Rule 1-102 (A) (5) (amended),
since the opinion of the case clearly indicates that the Bar did not show
that Polk's statement interfered with the administration of justice. Thus,
the application of the standard suggested here would preclude discipli-
nary action on the grievance committee level, and would remove the
chilling effect of the unamended rules, since no appeal would have to
be taken for the attorney's First Amendment rights to be considered.
Chet Zerlin
83. 269 Pa. 416, 112 A. 560 (1921).
84. 374 F. Supp. 784 (1974).
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